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The International Life of a Russian
Colonial Document
The Russian-American Company, the Kashaya Pomos, the
Bodega Miwoks, and the 1817 Métini Protocol
J E F F R E Y G L O V E R
Loyola University Chicago
abstract In September 1817 officials of the Russian colony of Ross
drafted a protocol of a meeting held with the Kashaya Pomos, the Bodega
Miwoks, and other Native Americans. The protocol described how the
Russians had promised gifts and military protection to their Native Amer-
ican allies in exchange for the right to continue occupying Métini, a
Kashaya Pomo–controlled territory about eighty-five miles north of San
Francisco. Soon, reports of the meeting had made their way up and down
the coast and across the Pacific, as Native Americans, Russian imperial
ministers, and diplomats from Russia’s imperial rivals debated its signifi-
cance. This essay describes how the Russian-American Company used the
protocol and other agreements with Native Americans to lay claim to
coastal territories, and how Russia’s imperial rivals disputed such claims.
It argues that company officials used documentation of Native American
signs of consent, such as speeches and gestures, to assert ownership of
Métini, while Spain disputed the validity of agreements with Native
Americans. The meaning that Russian officials assigned to Native Ameri-
cans’ consent enabled the Kashaya Pomos, the Bodega Miwoks, and other
groups to exert some influence over Russian colonization and trade.
The author would like to dedicate this article to Anastasia S. Kondrasheva, who
did so much to bring together different parts of the world. He would also like to
thank Glenn Farris, Ilya Vinkovetsky, James Gibson, Sergei Kan, Michael Khodar-
kovsky, Kent G. Lightfoot, Irina Lukka, Polina Pak, and Simeon Tsinman for help
with matters large and small. Finally, he would like to thank Kelsey Rydland of
Research and Learning Services at Northwestern University Libraries for excep-
tional assistance with the map, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their
immensely helpful critiques. This essay uses the United States Board on Geographic
Names system for transliterating Russian, except in the case of names already well-
known in English under other transliterations.
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On September 22, 1817, Kashaya Pomo leaders Chu-gu-an and Amat-tan
and Bodega Miwok leader Gem-le-le arrived at Ross, a Russian colony built
on land known as Métini to its Kashaya Pomo residents.1 There to welcome
them was Captain Lieutenant Leontiy Hagemeister, a Russian-American
Company official who sought their blessing for the Russian presence. But
Hagemeister also had an ulterior motive: he planned to exploit the tribes to
prove Russian land rights to Spain, which had an outpost eighty-five miles
south at San Francisco. After the meeting was over, company officials drew
up a protocol—or diplomatic minutes—of the day’s proceedings. The docu-
ment described Chu-gu-an making an act of “cession” or legal transfer of
land to the company. It also said he accepted “gifts” and “refreshments”
(including a medal inscribed “Allies of Russia”) and joined a defense pact
with the Russians “against other Indians.”2 The Russians had ostensibly
made a perfectly legitimate deal with tribal leaders—land for military aid.
1. The Bodega Miwoks were part of the Coast Miwoks and lived at Bodega Bay.
Amat-tan may have been Southern Pomo, a Pomo-speaking group that occupied
territory primarily to the north and west of Kashaya Pomo lands. See Robert Oswalt
to Alexei A. Istomin, 8 June 1981, personal correspondence, cited in James R. Gib-
son and Alexei A. Istomin, comps. and eds., Russian California, 1806–1860: A His-
tory in Documents, trans. James R. Gibson (London: Hakluyt Society, 2014), vol. 1,
322n2. However, the protocol’s description of his residence as “not distant” suggests
an affiliation with the Kashaya Pomos; see Russian California (hereafter cited as
RC), 1:322. Today, the Kashia Band of Pomo Indians of the Stewarts Point
Rancheria and the Federated Indians of Graton Rancheria are federally recognized
tribes. This essay will use tribe to describe them. The date of the meeting is given
in the Julian calendar.
2. RC, 1:322. An English translation of the treaty appears in RC, 1:322–23. For
a Russian transcription, see “Protokol vstrechi v Rosse indeyskikh vozhdey s
kapitan-leytenantom L.A. Gagemeysterom, udostoveryayushchiy ikh druzheskie
otnosheniya s russkimi,” in A. A. Istomin, Dzh. R. Gibson, and V. A. Tishkov,
comps. and eds., Rossiya v Kalifornii: russkiye dokumenty o kolonii Ross i rossiysko-
kaliforniyskikh svyazyakh 1803–1850 (Moscow: Nauka, 2005), 1:257–59. The sole
surviving manuscript of the treaty is located in the Arkhiv vneshney politiki Ros-
siyskoy Imperii (Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Empire), Moscow.
Transcriptions of parts of the document and a discussion appear in N. N. Bolkhovi-
tinov, Russko-Amerikanskiye otnosheniya: 1815–1832 (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), 142.
For the history of the treaty and the first English translation, see Diane Spencer-
Hancock and William E. Pritchard, “Notes to the 1817 Treaty between the
Russian-American Company and Kashaya Pomo Indians,” trans. Ina Kaliakin, Cal-
ifornia History 59, no. 4 (1980/1981): 306–13. Another translation appears in Basil
Dmytryshyn, E. A. P. Crownhart-Vaughan, and Thomas Vaughan, eds., The Rus-
sian American Colonies, 1798–1867: A Documentary Record (Portland: Oregon His-
torical Society Press, 1989), 296–98.
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Hagemeister duly sent the protocol to St. Petersburg, hoping the czar’s
ministers would show it to Spain.3
Yet for all its proper legal form, the protocol did not seem to convince
anyone of Russian rights. A Russian sailor on the ship back to St. Peters-
burg scoffed at its contents, claiming that tribal leaders could not have
understood what it meant.4 Russian imperial ministers took an equally skep-
tical view, asking company officials to account for the medals they handed
out.5 Some Bodega Miwoks also demurred, telling a Spanish padre that the
Russian-American Company had negotiated only modest rights to Métini.6
And most ominous were the actions of Spanish officials in San Francisco,
who had a plan in motion to destroy the colony and showed no sign of
acknowledging Russian claims.7 Though meant to prove its claim to Métini
once and for all, the protocol left the company only more uncertain of its
rights.
The 1817 Métini protocol shows the importance of Native Americans in
imperial conflicts over Pacific land rights. Documentation of diplomacy
with Native Americans was central to the Russian-American Company’s
colonial endeavors in California. Lacking the might for violent conquest,
the company instead tried to get land by making agreements with Native
Americans. This legal strategy was well established in international law.
3. For the protocol’s path to St. Petersburg, see RC, 1:390. Hagemeister also
took a copy of the protocol to company headquarters in New Archangel (modern-
day Sitka, Alaska), where it made its way to St. Petersburg on the Suvorov, which
returned to Russia on October 18, 1818. The existence of such correspondence is
indicated by a reference to the treaty in a report of the company’s board to Alexan-
der I that postdates the return of the Suvorov but predates Hagemeister’s return on
the Kutozov and Golovnin’s return on the Kamchatka. See “Glavnoye pravleniye
Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy kompanii Aleksandru I,” in Aleksey Narochnitskiy, ed.,
Vneshnyaya politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka: Dokumenty Rossiyskogo Ministers-
tva Inostrannykh Del, series 2 (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1976), 10:576.
See also the report by Hagemeister quoted in Alexey Postnikov and Marvin Falk,
Exploring and Mapping Alaska: The Russian-American Era, 1741–1867, trans. Lydia
Black (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2015), 278.
4. RC, 1:390.
5. RC, 1:404.
6. Mariano Payeras, Writings of Mariano Payeras, trans. and ed. Donald C. Cut-
ter (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Bellerophon Books), 335.
7. For the interrogation, see RC, 1:399; and Otto Von Kotzebue, A New Voyage
Round the World, in the Years 1823, 24, 25, and 26 (London, 1830), 2:122. For the
plan to destroy the colony, see W. Michael Mathes et al., The Russian-Mexican
Frontier: Mexican Documents Regarding the Russian Establishments in California,
1808–1842 (Jenner, Calif.: Fort Ross Interpretive Association, 2008), 108.
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Western powers often brandished contracts and treaties with Native Ameri-
cans to claim colonial territory.8 Yet in the case of the Russian-American
Company’s bid for Métini—a territory claimed by multiple imperial
powers—this strategy did not succeed. The protocol persuaded few and was
summarily rejected by the Russian government and Russia’s imperial rivals.
Given its failure, the protocol could be dismissed as a botched effort to
defend a doomed colony that would be sold off in 1841. Still, the story of
its creation and circulation reveals a much broader picture of how different
imperial powers used Native Americans to justify colonial claims. It also
shows how Native Americans used their relationships with imperial diplo-
mats to negotiate trade deals and military alliances. As the controversy over
the Métini protocol reveals, documents of interactions with Native Ameri-
cans took on importance far from colonial contact zones and shaped impe-
rial contests for land along the Pacific coast.
Existing scholarship on the Métini protocol emphasizes its importance
to the Russian-American Company’s relationship with the imperial govern-
ment.9 Ross had a precarious place in the Russian Empire. Company offi-
cials built the colony without the czar’s explicit permission, settling on a
contested territory between the Spanish presidio at San Francisco and an
American outpost at the Columbia River. They sent home documents such
as the protocol hoping that Russian diplomats would defend their land
claims to foreign rivals. Such documents were part of a complex interna-
tional lobbying effort meant to persuade their own government as well as
8. Since the Russians and their European rivals in California used varied ele-
ments of imperial law, natural rights, and the law of nations to stake claims in North
America, this essay will use the generic term international law to describe the rules
and norms European states cited in their dealings with one another. For accounts
of Europeans using contracts with Native Americans to claim land in North
America, see Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on
the Frontier (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005); Francis
Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1994); and Colin G. Calloway, Pen and Ink Witch-
craft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013). For a global view, see Jennifer Pitts, Boundaries of the Inter-
national: Law and Empire (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 2018).
9. Accounts of the treaty emphasizing its imperial context can be found in P. A.
Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, trans. and ed. Richard
A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978)
[originally published 1861–63], 139–40; Bolkhovitinov, Russko-Amerikanskiye
otnosheniya, 140–44; and Spencer-Hancock and Pritchard, “Notes to the 1817
Treaty,” 306–13.
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foreign opponents of their rights to colonial territory. However, although
the importance of the protocol to the company’s lobbying has been well
established, the role of Native Americans in its diplomatic strategy deserves
greater attention.
The Métini protocol documented the Russian-American Company’s
relationship with Native Americans—specifically the Kashaya Pomos, who
occupied the land where Ross was built; and the Bodega Miwoks, part of
the Coast Miwoks, who lived about twenty miles south, and on whose terri-
tory the company built Port Rumyantsev in 1809. The 1817 exchange was
part of a longer history of interactions with Native Americans that dated to
the beginning of Russian arrival in the Americas in 1741. Before the proto-
col, Russians had made contact with Native Americans in Alaska, Hawaii,
California, and other areas visited or colonized by Russian-led ventures.10
Many of these interactions were violent. In Alaska, for example, Russians
brutally subjugated Aleuts and Tlingits, taking them hostage and forcing
them into slavery. In early California, however, Russians initially established
10. On the Russian-American Company in Alaska, see Lydia T. Black, Russians
in Alaska, 1732–1867 (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2004); Andrei
Val’terovich Grinev, The Tlingit Indians in Russian America, 1741–1867 (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 2005); A. V. Grinëv, “Tuzemtsy Alyaski, russkiye
promyshlenniki i Rossiisko-Amerikanskaya kompaniya: sistema ekonomicheskikh
vzaimootnoshenii,” Etnogracheskoye obozreniye 3 (2000), 74–88; “Kharakter vzai-
mootnosheniy russkikh kolonizatorov i aborigenov Alyaski,” Voprosy istorii 8 (2003),
96–111; Andrei V. Grinëv, “The Dynamics of Barter Between the Russians and
Alaskan Natives, 1741–1867,” Folk Life 55, no. 2 (2017): 67–87, among other arti-
cles by the same author; A. V. Zorin, “Mezhdu dvukh ogney: indeitsy denayna i
russkie mekhopromyshlenniki v kontse XVIII veka,” in A. A. Borodatova and V. A.
Tishkov, eds., Vlast’ v aborigennoy Amerike (Moscow: Nauka, 2006), 592–610,
among other articles by the same author; and Sonja Luehrmann, Alutiiq Villages
under Russian and U.S. Rule (Fairbanks: University of Alaska Press, 2008). For an
account of the Tlingit perspective on wars with the Russians, see Nora Marks
Dauenhauer, Richard Dauenhauer, and Lydia T. Black, Anóoshi Lingı́t Aanı́ Ká /
Russians in Tlingit America: The Battles of Sitka, 1802 and 1804 (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 2008). For Russians in Hawaii, see Peter R. Mills, Hawai’i’s
Russian Adventure: A New Look at Old History (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2002); and Richard A. Pierce, Russia’s Hawaiian Adventure, 1815–1817
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965). Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia
and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1996) is a study
of Russian colonization of Siberia, a precedent for later Pacific colonization. For a
fuller account of the recent Russian-language historiography of Russian America,
see Andrei V. Grinëv, “A Brief Survey of the Russian Historiography of Russian
America of Recent Years,” trans. Richard L. Bland, Pacific Historical Review 79, no.
2 (2010): 265–78.
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diplomatic contacts with Kashaya Pomo and Coast Miwok leaders, negoti-
ating for land, labor, and military aid using gifts, goods, and imperial arti-
facts such as medallions and flags.11 Though they later conscripted Kashaya
Pomos into forced labor, these initial contacts involved some element of
11. The major documentary sources for the study of Russian California are A. A.
Istomin, Dzh. R. Gibson, and V. A. Tishkov, comps. and eds., Rossiya v Kalifornii;
and in English, RC. On Russian California, see James R. Gibson and Alexei A.
Istomin, “Introduction,” in RC, 1:1–173; and Glenn J. Farris, “The Russian Imprint
on the Colonization of Califomia,” in Columbian Consequences, vol. 1, Archaeological
and Historical Perspectives on the Spanish Borderlands West, ed. David Hurst Thomas
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1989), 481–97, among other articles
by the same author. Accounts of the Russian-American Company that provide
important context for understanding Russian colonization in California include
James R. Gibson, Imperial Russia in Frontier America: The Changing Geography of
Supply of Russian America, 1784–1867 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976);
A. Iu. Petrov, Rossiysko–Amerikanskaya Kompaniya: deyatel’nost’ na otechestvennom i
zarubezhnom rynkakh, 1799–1867 (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, 2006);
Ilya Vinkovetsky, Russian America: An Overseas Colony of a Continental Empire,
1804–1867 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); and Kenneth N. Owens
with Alexander Yu. Petrov, Empire Maker: Aleksandr Baranov and Russian Colonial
Expansion into Alaska and Northern California (Seattle: University of Washington
Press, 2015). Anthologies of Russian writings about the settlement of Fort Ross
include Glenn J. Farris, ed., So Far From Home: Russians in Early California (Berke-
ley, Calif.: Heyday, 2012); and James R. Gibson, ed., California Through Russian
Eyes, 1806–1848 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013). For Russian-
language scholarly works from the imperial era that touch on California, see P. A.
Tikhmenev, Istoricheskoye obrozreniye obrazovaniye Rossiysko-amerikanskoy kompanii
i deystviy eyë do nastoyashchego vremeni, two vols. (St. Petersburg, 1861–63), trans.
in Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company; and V. A. Potekhin,
“Selenie Ross,” Zhurnal manufaktur i torgovli 8 (St. Petersburg, 1859), 1–42.
For Soviet-era works on the Russian-American Company that mention Russian
California, see Semën Okun, Rossiysko-Amerikanskaya Kompaniya (Moscow: State
Socio-Economic Press, 1939), trans. in S. B. Okun, The Russian-American Com-
pany, ed. B. D. Grekov, trans. Carl Ginsburg (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951); N. N. Bolkhovitinov, Stanovleniye Russko-Amerikanskikh otnosheniy,
1775–1815 (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), trans. in Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov, The Begin-
nings of Russian-American Relations, 1775–1815, trans. Elena Levin (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1975); Bolkhovitinov, Russko-Amerikanskie otnosheniya;
A. I. Alekseyev, Sud’ba Russkoy Ameriki (Magadan, Russia: Magadan Book Publish-
ing House, 1975), trans. as A. I. Alekseev, The Destiny of Russian America 1741–
1867, ed. R.A. Pierce, trans. Marina Ramsay (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press,
1990); and Svetlana G. Fedorova, Russkoye naseleniye Alyaski i Kalifornii. konets
XVIII v.–1867 g (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), trans. as Svetlana G. Fedorova, The Rus-
sian Population in Alaska and California, Late 18th Century–1867, trans. and ed.
Richard A. Pierce and Alton S. Donnelly (Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press,
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reciprocity.12 Russians offered gifts for peace; Native Americans’ took
Russian- and Asian-made goods to trade with other tribes and kin groups.13
By 1817 Russian-American Company officials had held many meetings
with coastal leaders—including at least one where they discussed Russian
rights to Métini.14
This earlier history of cross-cultural exchange between Russian-speaking
colonists, Kashaya Pomos, Coast Miwoks, and other tribes is an important
context for understanding the Métini protocol. The document was an
attempt to frame the Russians’ entire history of interactions with the
Kashaya Pomo and Coast Miwok tribes as a single act of land cession that
Spain, the United States, and the Russian imperial government would rec-
ognize as legally valid. As it turned out, however, the Russians could not
1973). For more recent Russian-language scholarship, see the essays in N. N. Bol-
khovitinov, ed., Istoriya Russkoy Ameriki (1732–1867), three vols. (Moscow: Interna-
tional Relations, 1997–99). On Native American groups during the era of Russian
colonization, see Kent G. Lightfoot, Native Americans, Missionaries, and Merchants:
The Legacy of Colonial Encounters on the California Frontiers (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2005); Ed D. Castillo, “The Native Response to the Colonization
of Alta California,” in Thomas, Columbian Consequences, 1:377–94; Julia G. Cos-
tello and David Hornbeck, “Alta California: An Overview,” in Thomas, Columbian
Consequences, 1:303–31; George Harwood Phillips, Indians and Intruders in Central
California, 1769–1849 (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993);
A. A. Istomin, “Russko-indeyskiye kontakty v svete novykh dannykh,” in Ameriki-
anskiye indeytsy: novyye fakty i interpretatsii problemy indeanistiki, ed. V. A. Tishkov
(Moscow: Nauka, 1996), 26–47; A. A. Istomin, “ ‘Indeiskii faktor’ v kaliforniyskoi
politike Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy kompanii na nachal’nom etape kolonizatsii
(1807–1821 gg.),” in A. A. Borodatova and V. A. Tishkov, eds., Istoriya i semiotika
indeiskikh kul’tur Ameriki (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), 452–463; and A. A. Istomin,
“Indeiskaya politika rossiyskoi kolonial’noy administratsii v Kalifornii v1821–1841
godakh” in A. A. Borodatova and V. A. Tishkov, eds., Vlast’ v aborigennoy Amerike
(Moscow: Nauka, 2006), 500–24, among other articles by the same author. For
Ross and the surrounding area, see Sally McLendon and Michael J. Lowry, “Eastern
Pomo and Southeastern Pomo,” in Robert F. Heizer, ed., Handbook of North Ameri-
can Native Americans, vol. 8: California (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institu-
tion, 1978), 306–23; Sally McLendon and Robert L. Oswalt, “Pomo: Introduction,”
in Handbook of North American Native Americans, 8:274–88; and Beverly R. Ortiz,
“A Bodega Miwok History,” in Kathleen Smith, ed., We Are Still Here: A Bodega
Miwok Exhibit (Bolinas, Calif.: Bolinas Museum, 1993).
12. See James R. Gibson, “Russia in California, 1833: Report of Governor
Wrangel,” The Pacific Northwest Quarterly 60, no. 4 (1969): 210.
13. Russians also took away many Native American artifacts. See Travis Hudson
and Craig D. Bates, Treasures from Native California: The Legacy of Russian Explora-
tion, eds. Thomas Blackburn and John R. Johnson (New York: Routledge, 2016).
14. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, 134.
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Figure 1. Kashaya Pomo and Coast Miwok California in the early years of
Russian settlement. Adapted from Sally McLendon and Robert L. Oswalt,
“Pomo: Introduction,” figure 3, in William C. Sturtevant, ed., Handbook of
North American Indians, vol. 8, California, ed. Robert F. Heizer (Washington,
D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 278; and Isabel Kelly, “Coast Miwok,”
figure 1, ibid., 415.
control the story of their negotiations with coastal tribes, nor could they
dictate how outsiders would understand it. Many players in the region—
Russian, Spanish, and Native American—would have different stories to
tell about the 1817 meeting, and with them, different claims to make.
COASTAL DIPLOMACY: THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COMPANY
AND THE FOUNDING OF ROSS
In drafting the protocol, Russian-American Company officials claimed dis-
puted territory. Ross was located north of the Spanish settlements of Alta
California, a colonial network of missions, presidios, and pueblos spread
out along the coast from San Diego to the presidio at San Francisco (see
figure 1). Russians called this territory “New Albion” using Sir Francis
Drake’s name for it. Their decision to claim it by Native American land
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cession emerged from a legal controversy between the Russian-American
Company, the Russian imperial government, and Spanish ambassadors.15
The dispute pitted Spanish assertions of rights based on discovery against
Russian rights based on Native American cession. The Métini protocol was
a carefully crafted legal document meant to establish that Chu-gu-an had
freely ceded territory to the Russians and joined them in a military alliance.
In making such a claim company officials carefully reframed their history of
prior interactions with the Kashaya Pomos and the Coast Miwoks, constru-
ing them as a legal transfer of land.
Russian-American Company officials presented the protocol as the
record of a single day’s events. Behind the document, however, was a history
of interactions with Native Americans in the region that went back years.
Russian-led colonization of the central California coast began around 1806
at the behest of company officials who hoped to establish a base for hunting
sea otters and supplying Alaskan outposts with produce. The first Russians
came to the region as leaders of hunting parties seeking new sources of otter
furs after overhunting in Alaska had wiped out north Pacific rookeries.
These expeditions lacked the means to construct a colony, but Aleksandr
Baranov, the chief manager (or governor) of the Russian-American Com-
pany, saw them in part as scouting expeditions for permanent occupation.16
Meanwhile, these ventures established diplomatic relationships first with
the Bodega Miwoks and later with the Kashaya Pomos who occupied
Métini.17
This diplomatic approach was motivated in part by military considera-
tions. The Russian-American Company was too weak to conquer Califor-
nia’s Native American population by force as they had the Alaskan Aleuts
and Tlingits. The Russians also worried about military resistance such as
the Tlingits had mounted in 1804–05,18 prompting the company to seek
peaceful coexistence with coastal Native Americans. In an 1806 account
of a fleeting encounter with Native Americans in Bodega Bay, Imperial
15. Potekhin, “Selenie Ross,” 21. See also Sir Francis Drake, The World Encom-
passed by Sir Francis Drake . . . (London, 1628), 80.
16. RC, 1:246–47, 264–69.
17. Gibson and Istomin, “Introduction,” in RC, 1:1–23.
18. See Black, Russians in Alaska; Grinev, The Tlingit Indians in Russian America;
Dauenhauer et al., Anóoshi Lingı́t Aanı́ Ká. Yu. F. Lisyanskiy, a Russian traveler,
recorded and published an account of one treaty of military alliance between Rus-
sians and a toyon (indigenous leader) at New Archangel in 1805 in terms that antici-
pated the 1817 Fort Ross Treaty. Yu. F. Lisyanskiy, Puteshestviye vokrug sveta v
1803, 4, 5, i 1806 godakh . . ., vol. 2 (St. Petersburg, 1812), 115–17.
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Chamberlain Nikolay Rezanov wrote to Foreign Affairs Minister Nikolay
Rumyantsev that a naval officer had “met four [Native Americans] who
were fishing among the rocks” and “treated them kindly,” giving them “tri-
fling presents” before having them “dressed and presented to the gover-
nor.”19 Likewise, Baranov’s instructions for an 1811 expedition ordered
Assistant Governor Ivan Kuskov to “mollify all of [the Native Americans]
with as peaceable and as friendly an appearance and reception as possible”
and to “indulge rudeness.”20 Diplomatic outreach was intended to avoid
military confrontation; documentation would show imperial ministers that
the company was doing everything it could to avoid a repeat of the war in
Alaska.
The diplomatic approach also gave the Russian-American Company a
way to claim land rights. Since the region they targeted for colonization
theoretically lay within Spanish and U.S. purview, land rights were just as
important to the colony’s survival as peace with coastal tribes. Company
accounts presented early contacts with Native Americans as acts of land
acquisition. In the spring of 1807 Timofey Tarakanov led a party of Aleut
hunters to Bodega Bay, where he briefly established a base and made con-
tact with the Bodega Miwoks. By way of diplomatic outreach, Tarakanov
claimed to have acquired temporary rights to land.21 Then an 1808–09
expedition led by Kuskov made contact with a Bodega Miwok leader who
helped the Russians locate sea otters. Kuskov gave unnamed Native Ameri-
cans (no doubt including the Bodega Miwok leader he met) “beads, pebbles,
dresses, and some iron knick-knacks” as well as “silver medals with the
inscription ‘Allies of Russia’ to wear around their necks.”22 And when
Kuskov traveled to the region again in early 1811, Baranov gave him thirty
19. RC, 1:215.
20. RC, 1:285.
21. Tarakanov’s account is described in K. T. Khlebnikov, Notes on Russian
America, part 1, Novo-Arkhangel’sk, trans. Serge LeComte, ed. Richard A. Pierce
(Kingston, Ontario: Limestone Press, 1994), 9. Mariano Payeras, a Franciscan mis-
sionary, reported in 1822 that he spoke to Bodega Miwok converts at San Rafael
who told him that the commander of a Russian ship named Talacani (possibly refer-
ring to Tarakanov) “stopped at Ross, and bought that place from its chief,
Panac:úccux” (Payeras, Writings of Mariano Payeras, 335). Payeras also mentioned
that the Russians purchased part of Bodega Bay around the same time as Ross. The
details of this account should be treated with skepticism since Payeras was a Spanish
rival of Russia. For an account of Payeras’s importance as a source for the history of
Russian colonization, see Glenn J. Farris, “Talacani, the Man who Purchased Fort
Ross,” Fort Ross Interpretive Association Newsletter, September–October 1993, [7–9].
22. RC, 1:275, quotation 1:288.
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newly minted silver medallions as well as twenty old tin medallions to “con-
fer . . . only upon the elders of those places where you are quartered, as well
as those of Bodega Bay and those who come from distant mainland [inte-
rior] places and bays, with a record of their abodes and names,” an indica-
tion that the company had claimed those places.23 On a third expedition at
the end of 1811, Kuskov also “met some of the native leaders and gave them
medals and gifts, for which they agreed to surrender voluntarily the area
that he needed for settlement,” by which he apparently meant Métini,
located some twenty miles north of the previous contact site at Bodega
Bay.24 The Kashaya Pomos apparently gave the company permission to stay.
By August 1812 work was underway on the Ross colony, where the com-
pany built a fort and adjoining settlement.25
Though there is no reason to doubt that Russians made a diplomatic
approach to the Coast Miwoks and Kashaya Pomos, Russians almost cer-
tainly misrepresented how Native Americans viewed such interactions.
Pomo- and Miwok-speaking groups did not trade land rights for payment
in the way the Russians implied. From their perspective exchanges of goods
were social and political in nature and helped maintain ties between differ-
ent kin groups and tribes. The Coast Miwoks and the Kashaya Pomos lived
in village clusters connected by a common language, cultural practices, and
kinship ties. They maintained these ties in gatherings where tribal members
met to give gifts and play games for objects such as beads, baskets, and
blades. Such gatherings reinforced a sense of shared identity among speak-
ers of the same language. They were also important in maintaining links
between different tribes: tribes and kin groups exchanged goods in an ongo-
ing process that consolidated political and kinship ties as well as the prestige
of leaders who acquired and circulated valued items.26 Since Sir Francis
Drake’s coastal exploration in the sixteenth century, the Coast Miwoks had
collected European- and Asian-made goods and circulated them in
exchange gatherings among themselves and probably among other tribes.27
23. RC, 1:281 (brackets in original); Khlebnikov, Notes on Russian America, 11.
24. Tikhmenev, A History of the Russian-American Company, 133.
25. The precise date of the fort’s construction is unknown. For a discussion of
the uncertainty in the records, see Gibson and Istomin, “Introduction,” in RC,
1:21–23.
26. Lightfoot, Native Americans, Missionaries, and Merchants, 45.
27. For Coast Miwoks’ acquisition of artifacts from Drake’s anchorage and their
trade with other tribes after the colonial era, see Mary E. T. Collier and Sylvia
Barker Thalman, eds., Interviews with Tom Smith and Maria Copa: Isabel Kelly’s
Ethnographic Notes on the Coast Miwok Indians of Marin and Southern Sonoma Coun-
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Native Americans probably saw Russian gifts in these terms—as establish-
ing social or political links. One piece of evidence is that in excavations of
the communities in closest contact with the Russians, archaeologists have
not found hoards or collections of Russian- and Asian-made goods, sug-
gesting that Native Americans traded Russian items inland.28 When they
gave gifts to coastal leaders, Russians were joining—perhaps at first
unknowingly—an expansive system of trade stretching along the coast and
inland, one used to keep up relations rather than pay for property rights.
Further evidence of how the Kashaya Pomos in particular viewed Rus-
sians can be found in tribal histories of Russian colonization. In 1958 Her-
man James, a Kashaya Pomo speaker, related a tradition about Russian
colonization: “Having landed, [the Russians] built their houses close to
where the Indians were. After staying for a while, they got acquainted with
them. They stayed with them. The Indians started to work for them. They
lived there quite a while; having lived there for thirty years, they returned
home.”29 Although James’s story from 1958 cannot be taken to reflect Chu-
gu-an’s views from 1817, it does show that Kashaya Pomos had a tradition
of viewing Russian occupation as a “stay” in the region, albeit one that
lasted “quite a while.” Such an acknowledgment of mutual acquaintance
and peaceful proximity was certainly not the same as the “purchase” and
later “cession” of land that Russians described, nor was it a recognition of
rights of indefinite occupation. Yet despite Russian misrepresentation of
exchanges with tribal leaders, company officials clearly had reached some
kind of mutual understanding with the Coast Miwoks and the Kashaya
Pomos. Neither group attempted violent resistance. By the time of the 1817
meeting with Chu-gu-an, Gem-le-le, Amat-tan, and other leaders, the
Russians had established some measure of acceptance of their presence, in
part by handing out gifts.
ROSS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
As company officials made peace with Native Americans, they faced obsta-
cles at home.30 The first concerned Ross’s founding. Russian-American
ties, California (San Rafael, Calif.: Miwok Archeological Preserve of Marin, 1991),
77, 203–04, 354–58.
28. Lightfoot, Native Americans, Missionaries, and Merchants, 175.
29. Herman James, “Tales of Fort Ross,” as told to Robert L. Oswalt, September
1958, in Robert L. Oswalt, ed., Kashaya Texts (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1964), 277.
30. For the administration of the Russian-American Company, see Basil Dmy-
tryshyn, “The Administrative Apparatus of the Russian-American Company,
1798–1867,” Canadian-American Slavic Studies 28, no. 1 (1994): 1–52; A. N. Yer-
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Company officials colonized Métini without permission from the czar,
which left them free to choose a location but deprived them of the czar’s
support in justifying the colony’s legality to foreign rivals. Their predica-
ment in this regard can be glimpsed in Foreign Affairs Minister Rumyant-
sev’s response to a letter from the Russian-American Company board of
directors requesting “imperial protection for the settlement undertaken in
New Albion in case the American [United] States, from envy should do
something.”31 In a reply Rumyantsev offered a pro forma reassurance of
“imperial protection” but stated that the czar refused “to have the state
undertake a settlement”32—meaning that although the czar would not order
the colony to be abandoned, nor could the company rely on imperial diplo-
mats to publish arguments for its legality as they could have in the case of
a colony built on the czar’s orders. It was therefore incumbent on Ross
officials to explain to skeptical ministers in St. Petersburg their legal justifi-
cation for colonizing this particular piece of land.
The difficulty in proving the legality of their claim to the czar was related
to a second obstacle that faced company officials—clearing their title against
Spain. Though the company had once feared an attack from the United
States, that never came to pass.33 Spain, however, asserted its rights with
molayev, “Glavnoye pravleniye Rossiyskoy-Amerikanskoy Kompanii: sostav, funkt-
sii, vzaimootnosheniya s pravitel’stvom, 1799–1871,” in Amerikanskiy yezhegodnik
2003 (Moscow: Nauka, 2005), 271–92; and A. V. Grinev, “Rol’ gosudarstva v obra-
zovanii Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy kompanii,” in A. O. Chubar’yan et al., ed., Rus-
skoye otkrytiye Ameriki (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2002), 437–50. For the formation
of the company see, A. Yu. Petrov, Obrazovaniye Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy Kompanii
(Moscow: Nauka, 2000). For a broader history of Russia in America, see V. P.
Petrov, Russkiye v istorii Ameriki (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).
31. RC, 1:276.
32. RC, 1:276. This is a model of colonialism that Okun has referred to as “cam-
ouflaged expansionism” (Okun, The Russian-American Company, 125).
33. RC, 1:276. For an account of the influence of U.S. activities on Russian
settlement in California, see Okun, The Russian-American Company, 121–22. On
the role of the Russian-American Company in Russia’s imperial rivalry with the
United States, see Howard I. Kushner, Conflict on the Northwest Coast: American-
Russian Rivalry in the Pacific Northwest, 1790–1867 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood
Press, 1975). Despite being rivals with the United States in the Northwest, Russians
also cooperated with American shipping concerns in the fur trade. See A. A.
Istomin, “Sovmestnyye Russko-Amerikanskiye promyslovyye ekspeditsii v Kalifor-
niyu (1803–1812 gg.),” Voprosy istorii 8 (1998): 105–13; and E. W. Giesecke,
“Unlikely Partners: Bostonians, Russians, and Kodiaks Sail the Pacific Coast
Together, 1800–1810,” Mains’l Haul: A Journal of Pacific Maritime History 43, nos.
3–4 (2007): 34–69.
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much greater menace: Spanish colonists confronted Ross officials directly,
and Spanish diplomats in St. Petersburg protested the colony’s existence to
the Russian government.34
At the basis of Spain’s protests was a competing theory of colonial land
rights. Historically, Spain based its rights to North America on its supposed
“discovery” of the hemisphere in 1492 and papal bulls donating the Ameri-
cas to the Spanish crown. As a basis for possession, the doctrine of discovery
held that a party who found a piece of land without an owner had the right
to take it.35 This doctrine held that Native Americans did not own the lands
they inhabited either because they were infidels or because they did not
understand land ownership. Despite having largely abandoned rights of dis-
covery in the North Atlantic world, Spain sporadically invoked such claims
in contests over the Pacific coastline through the early nineteenth century,
citing discovery to claim Nootka Sound as well as Ross.36 Although Spain
had not in any way settled or colonized the area north of San Francisco,
Spanish officials still viewed it as theirs and maintained to Russians that
34. For the rivalry with Spain on the Pacific coast, see Alexei A. Istomin, “Osno-
vaniye kreposti Ross v Kalifornii v 1812 g. i otnosheniya s Ispaniyey,” in Bolkhoviti-
nov, Istoriya Russkoy Ameriki, 2:190–274; and Diane Spencer Pritchard, “Joint
Tenants of the Frontier: Russian-Hispanic Relationships in Alta California” in Rus-
sian America: The Forgotten Frontier, eds. Barbara Sweetland Smith and Redmond
J. Barnett (Tacoma: Washington State Historical Society, 1990), 81–93. For broader
context, see N. N. Bolkhovitinov, “Russian America and International Relations,”
in S. Frederick Starr, ed., Russia’s American Colony (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 1987), 251–70; and Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its
Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
35. Andrew Fitzmaurice, “Discovery, Conquest, and Occupation of Territory,”
in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the History of
International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 841. For more on dis-
covery, see Robert A. Williams, The American Native American in Western Legal
Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990),
74–118. For the English use of this doctrine, see Robert J. Miller et al., Discovering
Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine of Discovery in the English Colonies (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2012). For its use in U.S. history, see Lindsay G. Robert-
son, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples
of Their Lands (New York: Oxford University Press 2005).
36. On Nootka Sound, see Daniel Clayton, Islands of Truth: The Imperial Fash-
ioning of Vancouver Island (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011),
184–85. For an account of Russia’s involvement in the area, see M. S. Al’perovich
and N. N. Bolkhovitinov, “Nutka-zundskiy krizis i oslableniye rossiysko-ispanskogo
sopernichestva na Severo-Zapade Ameriki,” in Bolkhovitinov, Istoriya Russkoy
Ameriki, 1:295–304. For Spanish use of discovery to protest Ross, see Potekhin,
“Selenie Ross,” 26.
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they had exclusive rights as far north as the Strait of Juan de Fuca.37 Their
claim to the coast immediately north of San Francisco in particular was
strengthened by the fact that Bodega Bay was named after the Spanish
naval officer, Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra, who mapped and
described the area in 1775.38
Initially European politics constrained Spanish protests against Ross. In
1812 Russia and Spain signed the Treaty of Velikiye Luki, making the two
countries allies against Napoleon Bonaparte. To stay on good terms with
Russia, the Spanish crown took a cautious approach to Ross, ordering the
viceroy in Mexico City “to show extreme delicacy in carrying out the liqui-
dation of the Russian settlement without damaging friendly relations
between the two countries.”39 Thus, Spanish officials in Alta California
were at first relatively polite in their protests.40 The defeat of Napoleon,
however, freed the Spanish to be more aggressive.41 On February 10, 1817,
the crown ordered officials of New Spain to destroy Ross.42 In April 1817
Zea Bermúdez, the Spanish ambassador in St. Petersburg, wrote to the
Russian foreign minister demanding that the Russian-American Company
“abandon a venture [Ross] that is incompatible with the state of peace and
the alliance existing between Russia and Spain,” adding that company offi-
cials had “illegally occupied” the area.43 On June 23, 1817, the crown reiter-
ated its order for destruction and colonial officials expressed their
willingness to carry it out.44 Though there is no evidence that the Russians
knew about the order, Bermúdez’s public remonstrance was menacing
enough.
In response to Spanish protests Hagemeister convened the September
37. RC, 1:311.
38. The authoritative account of this figure is Freeman M. Tovell, At the Far
Reaches of Empire: The Life of Juan Francisco de la Bodega y Quadra (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2008).
39. A. I. Sizonenko and M. Ortega, Rossiya i Meksika v pervoy polovine XIX v.
(Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1989), 21.
40. For the details of some of these protests, see RC, 1:295, 310–11. The fact
that Spanish officials protested the settlement while Spanish colonists negotiated
trade deals suggests that the protests were perfunctory rather than serious.
41. For this context, see Bolkhovitinov, Russko-Amerikanskiye otnosheniya,
140–44.
42. Mathes et al., The Russian-Mexican Frontier, 108.
43. RC, 1:315.
44. Mathes et al., The Russian-Mexican Frontier, 108. Spanish fears of Ross may
have been heightened by Americans spreading rumors that Russians wanted to
destroy Spanish possessions. See Potekhin, “Selenie Ross,” 17.
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22, 1817, meeting. Since company officials had received Kashaya Pomo
permission to stay years before, the meeting itself was not really about mak-
ing any new agreement with tribal leaders. Rather, it was meant to create a
paper trail that would prove the company’s rights to Russia and Spain. The
company drafted the protocol in an attempt to shift the legal framework of
the dispute about Métini from discovery—where Spain undoubtedly had
priority—to cession, or transfer of territory with an owner.
FROM DISCOVERY TO CESSION: NATIVE AMERICAN
CONSENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
Ironically, the Russian-American Company’s attempt to claim land by ces-
sion had roots in the writings of Spanish jurists, who were the first to cri-
tique land rights based on discovery and defend contracts with indigenous
inhabitants. The first prominent European critic of discovery was the Span-
ish jurist Francisco de Vitoria, who questioned the 1493 papal bulls award-
ing the Americas to Spain. Vitoria disputed the Spanish crown’s act of
claiming the Americas based on discovery, arguing that inhabitants already
occupying a territory had rightful ownership of it even if they were not
Christians. According to Vitoria, all people possessed natural rights regard-
less of their religion or culture, giving the inhabitants of the Americas full
title to their land. “[B]arbarians possessed true public and private domin-
ion,” he wrote,45 meaning that discovery “provides no support for possession
of these lands, any more than it would if they had discovered us.”46 Since a
rightful owner already possessed the land, the pope had no right to give it
to Spain.
Vitoria’s arguments about the legal standing of “barbarians” profoundly
influenced later international law.47 One consequence of his claim was that
45. Francisco de Vitoria, On the American Indians, in Anthony Pagden and Jer-
emy Lawrance, eds., Political Writings (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 264. To the objection that Native Americans were “madmen” and could not
own their land, Vitoria wrote that “they have some order (ordo) in their affairs: they
have properly organized cities, proper marriages, magistrates and overlords (domini),
laws, industries, and commerce, all of which,” like land ownership, “require the use
of reason.” See Vitoria, On the American Indians, 250.
46. Vitoria, On the American Indians, 265.
47. As Hugo Grotius wrote, “In considering treaties, the question is often asked,
whether it is lawful to make them with persons who are strangers to the true reli-
gion.” He concluded there was “no doubt” it was lawful. See Hugo Grotius, The
Law of War and Peace, trans. Louise R. Loomis (Roslyn, N.Y.: Walter J. Black,
1949), 171. The question of European treaties with infidels was mostly debated in
the context of military alliances. See Richard Tuck, “Alliances with Infidels in the
European Imperial Expansion,” in Sankar Muthu, ed., Empire and Modern Political
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European explorers could acquire land by contract with its inhabitants. If
Europeans could not seize land by force, they could come to an agreement
with its owners, a procedure described by numerous authorities in Vitoria’s
wake. In 1797, for example, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant
asserted that even in cases of “shepherds or hunters . . . who depend for
their sustenance on great open regions, [European] settlement may not take
place by force but only by contract.”48 This vision of “empire by treaty”
offered a way for colonial officials to claim rights to land by documenting
its acquisition from Native Americans.49
Claims based on contracts and treaties, however, also raised questions
about Native Americans’ consent to such agreements. By the eighteenth
century most legal authorities agreed in theory that Native Americans
owned their territory, but they wondered whether colonists’ dominance over
indigenous people and control of written documents made Native Ameri-
cans’ agreement to contracts and treaties all but meaningless. Kant, for
example, argued that colonial purchase of land was valid only if it “does not
take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding
their lands.”50 Although they acknowledged indigenous consent as a theo-
retical basis for land acquisition, some authorities doubted that it was always
valid in practice, believing that colonization was rife with deceit and vio-
lence and that paper records hardly guaranteed the legality of an agreement
made thousands of miles away.51
While western Europeans debated the rights of colonial occupation, Rus-
sian imperialists developed procedures of their own for conquering foreign
Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 61–83. For Vitoria’s role
in the history of theories of legal relations between Europeans and indigenous
nations, see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law,
13–31.
48. Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” in Practical Philosophy, trans.
and ed. Mary J. Gregor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 490.
49. For a general overview of this concept, see Saliha Belmessous, “The Paradox
of an Empire by Treaty,” in Empire by Treaty: Negotiating European Expansion,
1600–1900, ed. Saliha Belmessous (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),
1–18. For an account of North American land agreements between settlers and
Native Americans, which differed profoundly from those described by contempora-
neous legal theorists, see Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land.
50. Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals,” 490.
51. See Pitts, Boundaries of the International. For an account of how criteria of
rightful occupation were used to critique colonial endeavors in the English-speaking
world, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, Sovereignty, Property and Empire, 1500–2000
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
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lands. In the early modern era Russian protocols for acquiring territory were
more limited than those employed by clashing European empires. Whereas
European colonial treaties often recognized Native American polities as
sovereign entities ceding land to European crowns, Russian colonial docu-
ments portrayed conquered powers as offering allegiance to the czar, an act
deriving from imperial rituals of submission rather than theories of natural
rights.52 Russian imperialists made claims to Siberia (from the sixteenth
century onward), the Caucasus (from the mid-eighteenth century onward),
and Central Asia (from the mid-nineteenth century onward) by document-
ing subjugated leaders’ acts of fealty.
In the eighteenth century, however, Russian jurists began to circulate
European legal texts in Baltic and Russian universities. Starting with Peter
the Great and continuing during Catherine the Great’s reign, Russian
scholars translated and commented on works of natural law and published
treatises about the law of nations.53 Many of these works emphasized the
52. For Russian treaties with non-Christian people, see Michael Khodarkovsky,
Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (Blooming-
ton: University of Indiana Press, 2002), esp. 39–45, 51–56, and 135–39. See also
Michael Khodarkovsky, “ ‘Ignoble Savages and Unfaithful Subjects’: Constructing
Non-Christian Identities in Early Modern Russia,” in Daniel R. Brower and
Edward J. Lazzerini, eds., Russia’s Orient: Imperial Borderlands and Peoples, 1700–
1917 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997), 9–26. For imperial Russian
relations with Muslim polities, see Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam
and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2006), esp. 42, 45, 241–42. Willard Sunderland, Taming the Wild Field: Coloniza-
tion and Empire on the Russian Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004)
focuses less on treaties but provides useful context. Europeans used submission and
loyalty oaths as well; for example, see Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same
King Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). For a broader survey of Russian
foreign affairs including treaty relations, see John P. LeDonne, The Russian Empire
and the World, 1700–1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997). For an account of Russian diplomatic rela-
tions with Britain, see Matthew P. Romaniello, Enterprising Empires: Russia and
Britain in Eighteenth-Century Eurasia (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2019).
53. See V. E. Grabar, The History of International Law in Russia, 1647–1917,
trans. and ed. W. E. Butler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 33–215; and Lauri
Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015). See also William E. Butler, “Treaty Collections in Eighteenth-Century Rus-
sia: Encounters With European Experience,” in A. G. Cross, ed., Russia and the
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importance of consent in treaties with lesser powers. By some accounts Rus-
sians could make treaties with any foreign power regardless of race or reli-
gion, as long as they secured consent. As V. T. Zolotnitskiy, the author of
the first Russian treatment of the law of nations, put it, “the essence of a
treaty is the consent of both parties, which should be just, without regard
to distinction of peoples.”54 Zolotnitskiy’s conclusion echoed Vitoria’s argu-
ment from centuries before that non-Christian peoples had the natural right
to make agreements and cede land to outsiders. More importantly for the
Russian-American Company, it also gave Russians a way to acquire land
from such peoples without the need to rule them as subjects.
VERIFYING NATIVE AMERICAN CONSENT: FROM CESSION
TO MILITARY ALLIANCE
When documenting interactions with the Kashaya Pomos and the Coast
Miwoks, Russian-American Company officials used theories from interna-
tional law which held that Christian powers could acquire land by contract
with Native American owners. The purpose of the 1817 meeting at Ross
was to dramatize a tribal leader ceding land to company officials as his
natural right. Notably, the company did not document the meeting in the
form of a treaty, the genre typically used by Spain, the United States, and
other imperial powers to record agreements with each other; instead they
drafted a protocol, a format most often employed in meetings between dip-
lomats.55 One reason for this was that Russian negotiators were acting as
company officials, not diplomats of the imperial government. They had
little discretion to make an agreement on the czar’s behalf. By using a proto-
col, company officials stayed carefully within their bounds. A protocol also
sent the signal that the Russian-American Company did not regard tribal
leaders as fully sovereign or “treaty-worthy.”56 Whereas a treaty implied that
signatories were somehow equal, a protocol sent no such message.
Using a protocol also enabled company officials to bypass the crucial
question of Native Americans’ understanding of written treaties. According
West in the Eighteenth Century (Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners,
1983), 249–58.
54. Quoted in Grabar, The History of International Law in Russia, 196.
55. For a discussion of this point, see Gibson and Istomin, “Introduction,” in
RC, 1:118–19. For examples of the company’s use of protocols, see RC, 1:310–11.
56. On “treaty-worthiness” see Eliga H. Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth:
The American Revolution and the Making of a New World Empire (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 2012), 11–13.
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to most legal theory, understanding was a necessary component of con-
sent.57 A party could not consent to an agreement without an understanding
of its terms. This had already been a problem for Russian-American Com-
pany officials in Hawaii. In 1816, the company had signed a treaty agree-
ment with Kaumuali’I, the chief of Kaua’I, but there was controversy over
whether he understood it.58 The protocol avoided this problem. Rather than
having to secure an “x” or written symbol to express Native Americans’
consent, company officials attributed direct speech to tribal leaders, quoting
the Native Americans’ own words to show that the tribal leaders understood
the agreement. And according to the Russians’ account, those words con-
firmed a simple transaction: land for military alliance.
In terms of international law, Russian transcriptions of Chu-gu-an’s
words and gestures confirmed a gift of land to the Russians. The Métini
protocol resembled, in part, what the legal scholar R.Y. Jennings has called
a “treaty of cession,” which performs “the transfer of territorial sovereignty
by one State to another State.”59 Treaties of cession were familiar instru-
ments in European diplomacy, as states and principalities redrew territorial
maps in the wake of eighteenth-century wars. They were also common
instruments of colonization and settlement, as colonial states and later the
United States used treaties to claim rights to Native Americans’ land.60
In the Métini protocol, however, the Russian-American Company
adapted the language of cession treaties to give the company’s negotiations
with Native Americans the appearance of a legally valid agreement. The
protocol began by focusing on Chu-gu-an’s disposal of Métini. “Captain-
Lieutenant Hagemeister thanked [the assembled Native American leaders]
57. For an account of this idea as it relates to indigenous groups, see Cathal M.
Doyle, Indigenous Peoples, Title to Territory, Rights and Resources: The Transformative
Role of Free Prior and Informed Consent (New York: Routledge, 2015).
58. See Mills, Hawai’i’s Russian Adventure, 25, 28–29; and Pierce, Russia’s
Hawaiian Adventure, 72.
59. R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester,
U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1963), 16.
60. For an account of English-language treaties of cession in North America, see
Daniel K. Richter, “ ‘To Clear the King’s and Indian’s Title’: Seventeenth-Century
Origins of North American Land Cession Treaties,” in Belmessous, Empire By
Treaty, 45–77. See also Allan Greer, “Dispossession in a Commercial Idiom: From
Indian Deeds to Land Cession Treaties,” in Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman,
eds., Contested Spaces of Early America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2014), 69–92. For a broader account of land transfer from tribes to colonists,
see Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land. For the complexity of treaties between
colonists and Native Americans who spoke different languages, see Calloway, Pen
and Ink Witchcraft.
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on behalf of the Russian-American Company for the cession [ustupka] of
the land for the fort, buildings, and facilities—a site belonging to Chu-
gu-an and called Med-zhy-ny by the inhabitants,” it opened. This language
sought to establish Chu-gu-an’s transfer of rights to the company as a legal
fact, showing that he had freely ceded the land and sovereignty over it to
the Russians in a manner consistent with natural rights. The protocol also
tried to show Chu-gu-an’s prior ownership of the land, a prerequisite of his
right to give it to the Russians. Ross was on “a site belonging to Chu-
gu-an,” at least formerly, and the Russians included the name for the site,
Med-zhy-ny (Métini), trying to show that the Kashaya Pomos previously
occupied and owned it. Finally, Hagemeister “thanked” all of the assembled
Native Americans—not just Métini’s supposed owner, Chu-gu-an—
implying widespread consent on the part of surrounding groups to Russian
occupation. According to the protocol, Chu-gu-an had lawfully ceded the
land to the Russians and no one had objected.61
Despite the seeming finality of Chu-gu-an’s cession, company officials
were well aware that it did not immediately translate into Russian rights.
To skeptical readers in Russia and other imperial governments, Chu-gu-an’s
act conceivably raised the question of why he would have given up so much
for so little. It also left unexplained how nearby Native American leaders
not included in the gathering might have viewed the matter. The Métini
protocol tried to resolve these issues by portraying Chu-gu-an’s cession of
land as an attempt to secure Russian military protection, thus providing
Kashaya Pomo and other tribal leaders a rationale for giving up the land to
the Russians.
According to the protocol, Chu-gu-an gave up Métini because he wanted
Russian protection. After thanking the chief for the gift, Hagemeister
“stated that he hoped that [the Native Americans] would have no reason to
regret the proximity of the Russians.” In response, “Chu-gu-an, as well as
Amat-tan, whose residence was also not distant, answered ‘that they are
very pleased with the occupation of the site by the Russians, that they now
live in security against other Indians, who formerly attacked them, and that
this security began only from the time of the settlement.’ ”62 Chu-gu-an
ceded the land, the Russians explained, because he wanted their help against
enemy Indians. Thus, he had a reason to give it away. This explanation,
however, does not match any extant description of Kashaya Pomos’ conflicts
with other Native Americans from the time period. Russian-American
61. RC, 1:322.
62. RC, 1:322.
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Company records and twentieth-century oral traditions both documented
revenge killing involving Kashaya Pomos, but not military peril.63 There is
no evidence, outside the protocol, that Kashaya Pomos were waging a
defensive struggle against enemy tribes. A possible explanation for the dis-
crepancy is that, in order to supply a plausible motivation for Chu-gu-an’s
cession of land, Ross officials mistook or deliberately misconstrued coastal
practices of revenge killing as a military threat from other Native Ameri-
cans. One piece of evidence for this interpretation is that Russians did
indeed intervene to stop revenge killing, apparently largely putting a halt to
the practice.64 Revenge killing, however, was usually governed by a sense of
reciprocity and did not resemble the open military conflict described in the
protocol.
A more probable explanation is that Chu-gu-an, Amat-tan, and Gem-
le-le had in fact sought out Ross for protection from Spanish-led slave raid-
ers, who ranged as far north as Bodega Bay.65 If this explanation is correct,
the protocol accurately reported the tribal leaders’ motive for gathering
at the fort, but altered the nature of the threat to avoid offending Spain.66 In
their internal correspondence, Russian-American Company officials often
emphasized Spanish violence against Native Americans as a justification
for occupying land north of the Spanish colonies. In the 1806 report to
Rumyantsev, Imperial Chamberlain Rezanov portrayed the Spanish as bru-
tally subjugating Native Americans. “[T]he missionaries in California have
completely enslaved their neophytes,” he wrote. “[The Native American’s]
advantages are forgotten, the brawn and brain of his kin are converted to
cattle, his spirit is killed forever.”67 Company correspondence likewise por-
trayed Native Americans’ fear and hatred of the Spanish. “[Russian scouts]
met several natives,” one report read, “who, taking them for Spaniards,
would have attacked them but, recognizing that they were not, readily let
them pass.”68 Other reports claimed that Native Americans were “hunted
63. For Russian records of coastal revenge killing, see RC, 1:456–57. For
Kashaya Pomo accounts of such practices, see Herman James, “Brothers Avenge the
Death of Their Sister,” as told to Robert L. Oswalt, September 1958, in Oswalt,
Kashaya Texts, 241–45; and James, as told to Oswalt, September 1958, “The Last
Vendetta,” in Oswalt, Kashaya Texts, 255–59.
64. James, “The Last Vendetta.”
65. RC, 1:398.
66. For this theory, see RC, 1:322n4.
67. RC, 1:226.
68. Ibid., 1:288.
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like animals” and “attack the Spaniards as enemies.”69 Yet company officials
omitted any mention of such matters in the protocol. Spanish diplomats
obviously would not have accepted a litany of Spanish crimes as a justifica-
tion for Russian colonization, nor could Russian imperial ministers in St.
Petersburg have been expected to relay such justifications to their Spanish
counterparts. Moreover, both Russian and Spanish foreign ministers might
have viewed a military alliance between the Russian-American Company
and Native Americans against the Spanish as cause to eliminate the colony.
In describing Chu-gu-an’s rationale, the company therefore substituted a
Native American threat for a Spanish one, giving Chu-gu-an and the other
leaders a reason for accepting Russian help without risking offense to Span-
ish officials.
Despite emphasizing military aid as the basis of the Russian-American
Company’s friendship with the Kashaya Pomos and the Bodega Miwoks,
in reality the company did little to protect Native Americans from Spanish
incursions. A report from a Russian imperial naval officer visiting Ross
shortly after the 1817 meeting noted mockingly that when “Spaniards
extend their hunting of men as far as Great Bodega itself . . . all of the
Indian tribes assemble under the cannons of Ross or at the harbour of
Rumyantsev, where they think that 4 falconets and three Russians are able
to defend them from the Spaniards.”70 This suggests that those gathered at
Ross on September 22, 1817, may have been fleeing a Spanish-led slave-
trading raid. The officer also provided information that contradicted the
protocol’s claims about Russian military aid to Native Americans, recount-
ing that in 1817, “when many [Native American refugees from the Spanish]
gathered at Slavyansk and requested its protection, [Kuskov] persuaded
them to keep to the woods and ravines in the hills and then attack the
Spaniards by surprise. The savages listened to him and then took to the
woods that are visible on the Great Bodega side of Rumyantsev Harbour.”71
Though this gathering may have been prompted by the Spanish construc-
tion of Mission San Rafael in 1817, and possibly occurred before the mili-
tary alliance announced in the protocol, Kuskov’s instructions to the
refugees suggest that he expected them to protect the Russians, not the
other way around.
However untrue, the protocol’s account of a defensive alliance served the
69. Ibid., 1:377, 318.
70. RC, 1:398–99.
71. RC, 1:399.
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purpose of explaining Chu-gu-an’s rationale for ceding Métini to the Rus-
sians, a crucial part of verifying his consent. As the protocol had it, Chu-
gu-an gave the company the land so he and his people could enjoy the
protection of the fort. Crucially, the protection was the fort itself, not any
Russian troops deployed beyond the colony—an important distinction
given the lack of manpower at Ross and the concern that company involve-
ment in Native American wars would have caused the imperial government.
Company officials wanted to show imperial ministers that Chu-gu-an
thought he was getting something in return for the land, when in reality
they were giving him little.
In the protocol’s telling, company officials clinched the alliance by award-
ing a medal to Chu-gu-an. After an “agreeable response” to Russian inquir-
ies about land claims, “the chiefs and others presented gifts, and the
foremost of them, Chu-gu-an, was presented with a silver medallion
adorned with the Russian imperial coat of arms and the inscription ‘Allies
of Russia’, and it was stated that this gave him the right to respect from the
Russians because without it they need not come to [help] him, and that it
imposed upon him the obligation of solidarity and assistance should the
occasion require it; both he and the others declared their willingness and
expressed their thanks for the reception.”72
Whereas the act of land cession previously described in the protocol
derived from natural rights, the ritual of awarding a medal had quite differ-
ent roots: it was a common ceremony by which imperial powers recognized
loyal subjects. Like many imperial powers, Russia had used award medals
to portray Native Americans as loyal allies of the czar. During I. I. Billings’s
voyage to the Aleutian Islands in 1791, Catherine the Great had instructed
him to distribute gold, silver, and copper medals to Alaska Native leaders
“as a symbol of the customary friendship of the Russians toward them,” as
a 1785 decree put it.73 However, though this instruction sounded like an
attempt to secure political subjection—and had been used in exactly such a
72. RC, 1:322.
73. A. I. Alekseyev et al., Russkiye ekspeditsii po izucheniyu severnoy chasti Tikhogo
okeana vo vtoroy polovine XVIII v: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), 206.
For background on these medals, see V. A. Durov, “Osvoyeniye Severo-Vostoka
Rossii v russkikh nagradnykh medalyakh vtoroy poloviny XVIII v.” in N. K. Gavry-
ushin and A. S. Fedorov, eds., Pamyatniki nauki i tekhniki 1985 (Moscow: Nauka,
1986), 119–24; and Andrei V. Grinev, “Russian Award Medals for the Natives of
Alaska,” trans. Richard L. Bland, European Review of Native American Studies 18,
no. 2 (2004): 21–31.
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fashion during Russian conquests in Central Asia—in the case of early Rus-
sian exploration, it served the purpose of a claim of discovery, analogous to
the kind made by Spain. Russians intended the medallions not as a sign
that the czar would rule Native Alaskans—with all the obligations of care
and protection that would imply—but rather for the recipients “to display
in their dwellings . . . in order to signify to those who may stop there that
this land and its inhabitants [were] already in Russian possession.”74
Initially, Russians in California likewise used award medals to claim land
by discovery.75 In advance of the 1811 mission to reconnoiter the area north
of San Francisco Bay, Baranov instructed Kuskov to “hide the secret mark-
ers that I have entrusted to you in appropriate places: one plaque no. 000”
and “one coat of arms, and 30 new silver medallions, as well as the old 20
tin medallions” for Native Americans.76 Calling the plaque, coat of arms,
and medallions “secret markers” suggests that they were meant to show that
Russians had gotten there first.
By contrast, the Métini protocol portrayed the bestowal of a medal on
Chu-gu-an as a marker of cession and military alliance, hearkening back to
the original meaning of such ceremonies as acts of imperial subjection. The
protocol described the medal as marking an exchange of land for military
aid, with the expectation that Chu-gu-an would come to Russian aid as
well: “it imposed upon him the obligation of solidarity and assistance should
the occasion require it.” Just as important, the medal gave other Native
American leaders a chance to show their consent to the alliance. After Chu-
gu-an took the medal, all the gathered leaders “declared their willingness
[to assist the Russians] and expressed their thanks for the reception.” The
protocol ended with an affidavit from Russian officials testifying that they
had truthfully observed the Native Americans’ words and gestures, giving
the tribal leaders’ actions the status of sworn fact.77
74. RC, 1:317.
75. See Grinev, “Russian Award Medals for the Natives of Alaska.” For the
broader history of medal distribution in the Russian empire, see N. I. Chepurnov,
Rossiyskiye nagradnyye medali, three vols. (Cheboksary, Russia: Publishing House of
Chuvashiya, 1993).
76. RC, 1:281. The use of medals and gifts to secure indigenous loyalty in Cali-
fornia was preceded by the planting of plaques, dating as early as 1579 when Sir
Francis Drake was said to have buried the famous “plate of brass” at Drake’s Bay in
California, but continuing until Kuskov’s forays (Okun, Russian-American Company,
118, 121).
77. RC, 1:322.
PAGE 163................. 19421$ $CH1 02-13-20 10:41:03 PS
164 Early American Studies • Spring 2020
Figure 2. “Plan of Fortress Ross, 1817. Russian-American Company Map sent
to Madrid, Courtesy of State Naval Archives, St. Petersburg, Russia.” Courtesy
of Fort Ross Digital Conservancy.
With its concluding presentation of a medal, the protocol offered a dra-
matic narrative of the company’s rights under international law. In Chu-
gu-an’s cession of Métini and other tribal leaders’ acclaim, all nearby chal-
lenges to Russian control—both from Chu-gu-an and from neighboring
tribes—were seemingly preempted. More importantly from the company’s
point of view, the protocol proved the validity of their claim to rival Euro-
pean powers. Cession and military alliance made an argument for Russian
ownership of the territory that was theoretically valid under international
law. As much as the fort itself, Chu-gu-an’s acceptance of the medal
showed that the colony was lawfully occupied and defended, at least as the
company saw things.
THE AF TERLIFE OF THE MÉTINI PROTOCOL
The Métini protocol was one among many legal documents company offi-
cials prepared to prove the legitimacy of Ross to imperial rivals, including a
“Plan of Fort Ross” sent to Madrid (see figure 2).78 The protocol differed
78. The plan is currently located in the Russian State Archive of the Navy (Ros-
siyskiy gosudarstvenniy arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota, or RGAVMF).
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from others, however, because it made a legal argument in dramatic form.
The exchange of gifts and gratitude and the award medal distilled into
one ceremony several legal arguments for possession, showing that Native
Americans had ceded the land, that they had a reason for doing so, and that
they would not attack the colony in the future. Yet as with other appeals to
royal authority, company officials were uncertain about whether the docu-
ment would have any effect. They had to await a response from the czar or
his ministers as well as from Spanish diplomats to determine whether their
creative dramatization of legal arguments had satisfied Russian imperial
concerns or answered Spanish objections.
The immediate Russian response to the protocol was mixed. The docu-
ment’s first audience was Vasiliy Golovnin, a Russian Imperial Navy officer
tasked with inspecting Ross during an 1817–19 circumnavigation of the
world. After stopping at the colony, Golovnin took a copy of the protocol
back to St. Petersburg.79 In 1822 he published a book about the voyage and
described the document. His account revealed how colonial officials used
the protocol to defend their right to occupy the land. Golovnin wrote that
after he anchored his ship off the colony, “Mr Kuskov came aboard and
brought with him various fresh provisions and a copy (solely for which I
stopped here a second time) of a deed signifying that the land here had
been ceded by the Indians to the Russians.”80 The fact that Golovnin men-
tioned sailing back to get the protocol shows the urgency the company faced
in securing their claim to Ross, and the importance of their negotiations
with Native Americans to that goal. Golovnin also offered his opinion of
the protocol and its validity as a land claim. As a naval officer with involve-
ment in colonial ventures, he had every incentive to embrace negotiations
with Native Americans as a source of land rights. He therefore took a favor-
able view of the protocol, writing that the Russians “founded their settle-
ment with the voluntary agreement of the native inhabitants of this country
and with the permission of a people that does not recognize the authority
of the Spaniards and that is permanently hostile to them.” And, he contin-
ued, “This people gave [the Russians] the right to choose a site on the coast
and to settle it for a certain payment, which was made in various goods.
The continuing friendly disposition of this people to the Russians clearly
attests that they did not take possession of this land by force.”81 Though the
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military alliance as the reason for the gift—Golovnin’s interpretation reveals
his conviction that company officials had lawfully acquired the land from
its owner. Golovnin embraced Russian negotiations with the Kashaya
Pomos and the Bodega Miwoks as evidence of the company’s claims under
international law. Their “continuing friendly disposition” was in his view
sure proof of the company’s rights.
A member of Golovnin’s crew found it less credible, however, foreshad-
owing problems Ross officials would later face. Fëdor Litke, a midshipman
aboard Golovnin’s ship, commented on the protocol in his own narrative of
the voyage and voiced skepticism about it. “[A]n agreement with a man
who cannot read, write, or speak [Russian] and who in general does not
have the slightest notion of the meaning of the agreement, can only serve
as a pretence and not as a solid right and will probably be of no service,” he
wrote.82 Litke believed that Native Americans lacked the intellectual capac-
ity to form valid contracts and assumed the imperial government would
think the same. Though not representing any official opinion, Litke’s read-
ing of the protocol suggested that despite Golovnin’s confident assertions,
ministers in the imperial government might react with skepticism to land
rights deriving from agreements with Native Americans.83
Litke was right that the imperial government would question the proto-
col, but he was wrong about the reasons. On November 3, 1818, the com-
pany’s board in St. Petersburg made its official report on the protocol to the
imperial ministry, based on a copy that had traveled by way of company
headquarters in New Archangel, Alaska, in advance of the one carried home
by Golovnin. Using the protocol as a basis, the report stated that the Native
Americans living near the colony “all have unanimously expressed their
pleasure that Russians settled among them.”84 However, instead of criticiz-
ing this claim based on Native Americans’ supposed lack of understanding,
as Litke had anticipated imperial ministers might, Minister of Internal
82. RC, 1:390.
83. For the history of Russian ethnographers’ understanding of language and
ethnicity during this period, see Yuri Slezkine, “Naturalists Versus Nations:
Eighteenth-Century Russian Scholars Confront Ethnic Diversity,” Representations
47, special issue (Summer 1994): 186–90.
84. The report also noted that the Russians “became a barrier from attacks by
remote Native Americans living in the surroundings of the Spanish fort of San
Francisco,” a description that is also false since it was the Spanish themselves and
not Native Americans living near them who threatened the Bodega Miwoks and
conceivably the Kashaya Pomos. “Glavnoye praveleniye Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy
kompanii Alexandru I,” 10:576.
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Affairs Osip Kozodavlev criticized Hagemeister for exceeding his authority.
“Because it is not stated in the report who authorized Captain-Lieutenant
Gagemeister [Hagemeister] to give to the Indian chief . . . a silver medallion
with the inscription ‘Allied to Russia’ [sic], I therefore propose that the
Board of Directors of the Russian-American Company should provide me
with this information,” he wrote.85 Kozodavlev also asked the company to
account for its distribution of medals to Native Americans, including “how
many gold and silver medallions altogether . . . have been distributed, and
to whom, and who still has them.”86
Kozodavlev’s objection to the protocol was less about Native American
rights than about the company’s overreaching its authority. Yet Kozodav-
lev’s concern about how Russian medals circulated also showed his recogni-
tion that Native Americans had power and agency in such exchanges.87 The
anthropologist Kent G. Lightfoot has argued that the Kashaya Pomos man-
aged to exert some control over their dealings with the Russians by keeping
the colonizers at a distance, working at the colony or visiting it for trade
and retreating inland when they wished to avoid the newcomers.88 These
retreats from colony to forest allowed goods acquired from Russians to pass
inland to village clusters, as Kashaya Pomos incorporated Russian- and
Asian-made goods into their own economic and political practices and
redistributed them to villages beyond Métini. Like the goods the Russians
had given to the Coast Miwoks and Kashaya Pomos in years prior, the
unnamed “gifts” handed out by Russians at the 1817 meeting were probably
destined for networks of exchange that stretched from coast to interior, and
became part of Kashaya Pomo intervillage trading as well as their diplomacy
with other tribes. Chu-gu-an’s medal probably circulated in this fashion as
well. When the board wrote back to Kozodavlev to report on the fate of the
medals, they did not say what happened to it, other than to repeat that they
had given it to Chu-gu-an.89 Their silence suggests they may have lost track
of it, despite their order to Chu-gu-an to wear it.90 After acquiring medals
from Russians, Native Americans apparently controlled their circulation.
The reaction from Spanish colonial officials presented an equally urgent
85. RC, 1:404 (brackets added). The medal read “Allies of Russia” (RC, 1:322).
The board answered saying it had given Hagemeister the authority to give the medal
to Chu-gu-an (RC, 1:405).
86. RC, 1:404.
87. RC, 1:288.
88. Lightfoot, Native Americans, Missionaries, and Merchants, 164–65.
89. RC, 1:405.
90. RC, 1:322.
PAGE 167................. 19421$ $CH1 02-13-20 10:41:13 PS
168 Early American Studies • Spring 2020
test of the protocol’s success. Their direct response does not survive, but
their answer to a similar account of Chu-gu-an’s land cession that Kuskov
delivered in person shortly before the protocol’s creation shows their view
of the company’s arguments. In a journal of his service as a secretary on the
same voyage that took Golovnin to Ross, Fëdor Matyushkin offered an
account of a meeting between Kuskov and Golovnin, relating a story about
a confrontation with Spanish officials regarding the company’s claims to
Métini. According to Matyushkin, Kuskov told Golovnin that in 1816,
Otto von Kotzebue, a Russian naval officer, summoned him to San Fran-
cisco and “inquired of him in an imperious voice in the presence of Spanish
officials by what right he had occupied this territory [Métini].” Matyushkin
related that Kuskov “had to give an answer” but does not say what that
answer was, reporting only that Kuskov “tearfully” lamented Kotzebue’s
questioning of him “in the presence of the Spaniards.”91 Kotzebue’s own
narrative of a later visit to California in 1824, however, has a description of
an undated confrontation between Kuskov and Spanish officials that he
observed on an earlier voyage, in which Kuskov told the Spanish he had
“settled in this region, which had not previously been in the possession of
any other power, and over which, consequently, none had a right but the
natives; that these latter had freely consented to his occupation of the land,
and therefore that he would yield to no such unfounded pretension as that
now advanced by the Spaniards.”92 In this account of what is probably the
same conversation reported by Kuskov to Golovnin, it is the Spanish, and
not Kotzebue himself, who questioned Kuskov. It is possible that Kotzebue
questioned Kuskov at Spanish behest and then elided this detail of the story
in his own telling. But more importantly, Kotzebue’s account shows that
Kuskov used the same arguments found in the protocol to assert the com-
pany’s rights to Métini, saying that Native Americans “had freely consented
to [Kuskov’s] occupation of the land.” The fact that Kotzebue approvingly
repeated this argument in his own narrative suggests that he supported the
company’s claims, Kuskov’s “tearfu[l]” lamentations about the interrogation
in front of Spanish officials notwithstanding. But the Spanish complaints
voiced to Kotzebue also suggest that Spanish colonial officials rejected
rights deriving from Native American owners. Indeed, Kuskov’s worries
about how Kotzebue would report this whole exchange may have been the
immediate impetus for drafting the protocol in the first place.
The United States, which had claims to the Columbia River, presented
91. RC, 1:399 (brackets added).
92. Von Kotzebue, A New Voyage Round the World, 2:122.
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another threat to Ross. Russian-American Company officials had initially
feared that the United States might move to destroy Ross, mentioning a
possible American threat in their pleas to the imperial government for pro-
tection in 1809.93 But unlike Spain, the United States did not make plans
to eliminate Ross; a congressional committee reported in 1821 that the
Russian-American Company was only trading in the region.94 Either Rus-
sian imperial ministers had not given the protocol to the United States, or
the Americans ignored it. Either way, Golovnin wrote a response to the
congressional report heatedly asserting that its authors had overlooked Rus-
sian exploration of the coast.95 His omission of any reference to Native
American exchanges was significant. Despite embracing land cession else-
where, in his response to the United States, Golovnin asserted rights based
on discovery, arguing that the Russians had the right to occupy California
because they had extensively explored the region.96 Golovnin apparently did
not think Chu-gu-an’s cession would be recognized by the United States.
Russian colonists, so confident in their assertions in the protocol, found
themselves unable to persuade Spanish officials, U.S. congressional repre-
sentatives, or even imperial ministers in their own government of claims
deriving from Native American sources. Russia’s imperial rivals either
rejected or ignored company officials’ negotiations with tribal leaders, refus-
ing to recognize them as a land transaction. But these were not the only
groups with a stake in the proceedings. The Kashaya Pomos and the Bodega
Miwoks also had stories to tell. And though company officials had misrep-
resented their relationship with the tribes in the protocol, the Russians’
focus on the importance of Native Americans’ consent gave tribal leaders
leverage in their trade and diplomacy with the Russians.
BODEGA MIWOK AND KASHAYA POMO ACCOUNTS
OF THE 1817 MEETING
As copies of the Métini protocol made their way back to Russia, accounts
of the 1817 meeting at Ross also passed through Native American channels.
93. RC, 1:276.
94. See John Floyd, “Occupation of the Columbia River,” The Quarterly of the
Oregon Historical Society 8, no. 1 (1907): 69.
95. See V. M. Golovnin, Around the World on the Kamchatka, 1817–1819, trans.
Ella Lury Wiswell (Honolulu: Hawaii Historical Society, 1979), appendix VII,
311–22, 317.
96. Golovnin, Around the World on the Kamchatka, 321n17. In claiming there
was “no trade,” Golovnin meant large-scale export of commodities. The remark
shows that he did not consider the company’s participation in Kashaya Pomo
exchange networks to be trade.
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Reports about Native American interpretations of the meeting suggest that
tribal leaders, far from feeling cheated, saw it as an opportunity to increase
their trade with Europeans and bolster their standing among other Native
Americans. During the same voyage on which he collected the protocol,
Golovnin met with a Bodega Miwok chief living in Bodega Bay whom he
called “Valenila,” who was probably the same leader as the “Gem-le-le” in
the protocol.97 In the meeting Valenila “asked [Golovnin] for a Russian flag
so that with the appearance of Russian ships he would be able to raise it as
a sign of friendship of the people ruled by him with the Russians,” a request
Golovnin granted.98 The request suggests how Valenila might have viewed
the meeting at Métini: Valenila clearly thought that imperial gifts, such as
the medal bestowed on Chu-gu-an, conveyed great benefits to tribal leaders.
He wanted a flag for himself so that he could enjoy the same advantages.
He also wanted the flag as a way to establish trade relations with passing
ships not under their control.99 He knew that other Russians were indepen-
dent of Ross and hoped that, with the flag, he could deal with them directly.
Thus, he wanted the flag not as a sign of submission to Russian colonists,
but as an entrée to expanded opportunities for trade. Perhaps Chu-gu-an
used the medal in that way as well. In any case, the possibility of such
unauthorized use of imperial symbols may have been one reason Kozodavlev
questioned Ross officials about the medals.
There was also a Bodega Miwok story about Métini that differed from
the protocol. In his account of a meeting with Bodega Miwok converts in
1822, the Franciscan friar Mariano Payeras described how the converts
viewed the Kashaya Pomos’ agreements with the Russian-American Com-
pany. Pointedly, the converts told Payeras that the Russians bought only
Ross but “not the neighboring places.” The converts further limited Russian
97. A digest of the protocol the company’s board of directors sent to Alexander
I referred to Gem-le-le as Bale-lii-lye, probably a variant of Valenila (“Glavnoye
pravleniye Rossiysko-Amerikanskoy kompanii Aleksandru I,” 10:576). At the time
of the meeting in the protocol, the Bodega Miwoks were led by Gem-le-le’s father
Yolo, who died only in 1818 (Payeras, Writings of Mariano Payeras, 335). Gem-le-le
probably represented the Bodega Miwoks at the negotiations because Yolo was ail-
ing (RC, 1:399–400). Yolo’s death was depicted by the Russian painter Mikhail
Tikhanov, who witnessed it (RC, 1:397).
98. RC, 1:370. An alternate account of what was probably the same meeting
appears in RC, 1:399–400.
99. Fëdor Matyushkin stated that Valenila “was ordered to raise [the flag] as
soon as he sighted a ship with the same . . . promising him in that case rich gifts
from our compatriots” (RC, 1:399).
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rights to Bodega Bay, stating that Russians had “not purchased” any terri-
tory in the bay but only secured “permission” to stay there.100 Recounting
the treaty to Payeras, the Bodega Miwok converts sharply limited Russian
claims in their area, describing them as rights of temporary occupancy.
Moreover, they did not mention political subjection of any kind to the Rus-
sians, suggesting that the medal had not signified any allegiance to the czar.
The converts’ testimony suggests that, at least from the Bodega Miwoks’
point of view, the Russians’ gains were far less than the protocol reported.
Of course, as an agent of an imperial rival to Russia who was elsewhere
involved in negotiations about land rights, Payeras had an interest in pro-
moting a skeptical view of Russian rights in the region.101 The same is
true of the Bodega Miwok converts, who sought Russian protection but
downplayed Russian rights. They were one of many parties who framed the
story of Métini in their own terms and in accord with their own agendas.
Regardless of either party’s motives, Payeras’s exchange with the converts
underscores that the protocol was not a local affair but a geopolitical event.
Company officials, imperial ministers, diplomats of Russia’s imperial rivals,
and Native Americans on the coast all viewed the 1817 meeting differently,
depending on their framework for understanding land rights.
European debates about the protocol lasted only a few years. When revo-
lution came to Spain in 1820, the Russian government and Spanish diplo-
mats largely abandoned their dispute over the status of Ross. In 1821
Mexico achieved independence from Spain, once and for all removing Ross
from Spanish claims. Like Spain, Mexico persistently challenged Russian
rights in the region. Ross officials did not mention Native American treaties
in defense, however, emphasizing instead the Treaty of Velikiye Luki and
an 1812 treaty between Alta California and the Russian-American Com-
pany.102 From then on Russians in California did not invoke Métini as a
formerly Kashaya Pomo territory, and Native American rights were no
longer part of their claims. Assertions about agreements with Kashaya
Pomos and Bodega Miwoks appear to have been intended primarily to per-
suade Russian authorities or Spanish diplomats. These metropolitan offi-
cials were schooled in European ideas of international law such as discovery,
100. Payeras, Writings of Mariano Payeras, 335. Timofey Tarakanov was not the
commander of a Russian ship but rather the leader of a hunting party. For an expla-
nation of the Bodega Miwoks’ mistaken belief that Tarakanov had purchased Fort
Ross, see Farris, “Talcani.”
101. RC, 1:490–91.
102. RC, 1:490–92. For background, see William Richardson, Mexico Through
Russian Eyes, 1806–1940 (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988).
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cession, and alliance, whereas Ross officials did not seem to think that Mex-
ican officials would assign any significance to Native American rights. In
Russian-American Company discussions with Mexico, the Métini protocol
ceased to have any relevance to disputes over land rights.
The historians James R. Gibson and Alexei A. Istomin have argued that
after 1825, the Russian government “simply put the question of Ross aside,”
leading to a period of prolonged uncertainty over the status of the colony in
Russian imperial plans until its sale in 1841 to rancher John Sutter.103
Although the Métini protocol was written for a European audience, the
principles of alliance it articulated were still apparently meaningful to the
Bodega Miwoks and Kashaya Pomos for decades after. An 1833 account of
Bodega Bay by a Mexican military officer described a leader named
Gualinela—possibly the Gem-le-le mentioned in the protocol—guarding
Russian buildings in exchange for protection of his rancheria.104 The mili-
tary alliance between the colony and surrounding Native Americans thus
continued to have some meaning years later, despite the Russians’ refusal to
protect the tribes when Kuskov had sent them to fight the Spanish in 1817.
For their part, the Kashaya Pomos never called on the Russians for help.
As late as the 1950s, however, Kashaya Pomo storytellers still remembered
instances of equitable treatment by the Ross colonists that were consistent
with the principles of reciprocity found in the protocol.105
The Métini protocol has a divided legacy. It recorded Kashaya Pomo and
Bodega Miwok responses to colonial invasion but did so for decidedly colo-
nial reasons. Nevertheless, the protocol reveals how, in the workings of
imperialism in the Pacific world, diplomacy with Native Americans had
geopolitical significance, even as indigenous territories came under imperial
control.
103. “Introduction,” in RC, 1:154.
104. Glenn J. Farris, “Story of the Purchase of Fort Ross and Payment for
Bodega Bay by the Russian Promyshlennik, Tarakanov,” Fort Ross Conservancy
Digital Library, Jenner, Calif., April 14, 1994, 6.
105. See Lightfoot, Native Americans, Missionaries, and Merchants, 164–65. For
reciprocity, see James, “The Last Vendetta”; and Herman James, “The Wife-
Beater,” as told to Oswalt, September 1958, Kashaya Texts, 269–71.
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